

## Jahez International Company (JAHEZ)

|                |            |                  |          |
|----------------|------------|------------------|----------|
| Recommendation | OUTPERFORM | Risk Rating      | R-3      |
| Share Price    | SAR14.79   | 12M Target Price | SAR18.00 |
| Implied Upside | 21.7%      |                  |          |

### Delivering Scale While Defending Margins; Initiate With Outperform

We view Jahez as a profitable homegrown online food delivery and quick-commerce platform that is leveraging its expanding ecosystem to drive monetization and margin gains despite intensifying competition. We initiate coverage with an Outperform rating and a 12-month PT of SAR18. Jahez's competitive positioning in Saudi Arabia – underpinned by its in-house logistics network, sticky customer base, and a merchant-friendly funding structure – has enabled it to become the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest food delivery player domestically (~30% market share in 2024). Our positive view reflects Jahez's solid market position, **strategic regional expansion, and resilient margins in the face of fierce competition**. While new entrants – specifically China's Meituan-owned Keeta – is challenging its long-established two-horse race with HungerStation, Jahez's strategic focus on higher-value users, platform diversification, and cost efficiencies (expanding in-house logistics, rising take-rates, and ancillary revenue streams) positions it to defend profitability as marginal costs fall. Even with signs of industry consolidation emerging – as Jahez team up with dark store operators (Noon and Doos) to leverage cross-selling opportunities, while smaller players fold (e.g. Shgardi) – Jahez will survive the market structure transition into potentially a four-firm oligopoly, given its local appeal and scale. Keeta has had a more pronounced impact on smaller players, though Jahez's 3Q2025 results raise concerns – volumes/GMV declined YoY for the first time since 2Q2023. **While user growth will naturally decelerate as app penetration rates follow an S-curve growth trajectory approaching saturation, the compounding value of increased order frequency, optimized take rates, and the maturation of high-margin merchant services will drive revenue expansion.** Meanwhile, the recent acquisition of Qatar's Snoonu extends Jahez's GCC footprint and should accelerate growth outside Saudi. We forecast a **15%/17% GMV/net revenue CAGR over 2025–30 with profitability improving in the medium-term**. With a reasonable valuation, Jahez offers a compelling play on MENA's booming on-demand delivery sector – balancing high-growth opportunities with disciplined operations – making it an attractive story for long-term investors despite near-term competitive headwinds. **Sporting ~15x 2026e P/E and ~10x 2026e EV/EBITDA, the stock looks attractive to global peers while its sub-1 PEG ratio bolsters outlook further.** The current share price bakes in too much bad news, falling ~63% from its 52-week high. For investors with a medium-term horizon, Jahez offers a balanced risk-reward profile and an opportunity to participate in the consolidation of a growth industry. Its strategic investments in logistics (Logi) and diversified commerce – retail (PIK) and grocery – position it uniquely to weather the commoditization of food delivery, provided it can successfully defend its market share in Tier 1 cities against the "blitzscaling" tactics of Keeta.

### Highlights

- Scaled market leader driving diversified, profitable growth:** Founded in 2016, Jahez has emerged as one of Saudi Arabia's top two delivery platforms, commanding a ~30% market share and serving over 4.4mn active customers through 17,000+ merchant partnerships. Its asset-light model and early focus on customer experience enabled profitability ahead of peers, while strategic expansion beyond food delivery into quick-commerce, cloud kitchens, payments, and advertising has created multiple ancillary revenue streams that are growing faster than core commissions. Despite intensifying competition and aggressive discounting by new entrants, Jahez is defending market share by targeting premium customers and leveraging its platform into a multi-vertical model with ancillary revenue streams. **With Saudi GMV projected to grow at 7.0% CAGR through 2030, Jahez's diversified, capital-light approach positions it to sustain a high-20s market share and enhance monetization while protecting its margins.**
- Transformative Snoonu deal sustains strategic GCC expansion drive:** Jahez's acquisition of Snoonu accelerates its transformation into a pan-GCC leader, adding a high-growth, profitable asset that diversifies revenue and delivers immediate earnings accretion. **Jahez's mid-2025 agreement to acquire a 76.5% stake in Snoonu at \$320mn EV adds impetus to its pan-GCC project, now boasting Qatar's fastest-growing, profitable delivery super-app as part of its portfolio; this is juxtaposed against its loss-making, but improving, offshoots in Kuwait/Bahrain.** Despite what seems a premium valuation – ~43x 2024 earnings, making it Qatar's first tech "unicorn" – the deal is justified by Snoonu's hyper growth (>3x GMV between 2022-24; 71% YoY 9M2025) and earnings accretion potential, giving Jahez immediate access to a high-income market and a likely template for regional expansion beyond its existing triangular footprint. The group also recently entered partnerships with dark stores as competition in Saudi heats up, demonstrating management's proactive resolve.

### Key Catalysts

- (1) Regulatory support by Saudi Arabia's Competition Authority potentially barring predatory pricing (2) Successful Snoonu integration and regional growth (3) Latitude for expanding blended take rate & improving unit economics (4) Faster uptake of new monetization streams (ads, fintech) (5) More share buybacks (given the attractive valuation) and/or initiating dividends (6) The "Saudization" moat vs. international peers

### Recommendation, Valuation and Risks

- Recommendation & Valuation:** JAHEZ is an Outperform with a blended DCF/Multiples PT of SAR18 and trades at 2026E EV/EBITDA ~8% premium (per consensus) to its regional peer Talabat – somewhat justified by Jahez's expected higher growth. The market has overly discounted "race-to-the-bottom" marketing tactics. We expect things to normalize in the medium term; YoY orders decline during 3Q2025, coupled with downgrading of full-year guidance spooked investors further. However, the recent share buyback aligns with our view of an "exaggerated share price discount".
- Risks:** Competition & price wars, execution, slower growth ex-KSA, and regulatory roadblocks.

### Key Data

|                            |                |
|----------------------------|----------------|
| Current Market Price (SAR) | 14.79          |
| Dividend Yield (%)         | 0.0            |
| Bloomberg Ticker           | JAHEZ AB       |
| ADR/GDR Ticker             | N/A            |
| Reuters Ticker             | 6017.SE        |
| ISIN                       | SA1660IIU0H3   |
| Sector*                    | Cons. Services |
| 52wk High/Low (SAR)        | 40.00/13.65    |
| 3-m Average Volume (mn)    | 1.4            |
| Mkt. Cap. (\$bn/SAR bn)    | 0.8/3.1        |
| EV (\$bn/SAR bn)           | 0.6/2.1        |
| Shares Outstanding (mn)    | 209.8          |
| FO Limit* (%)              | 49.0           |
| Actual FO* (%)             | 6.0            |
| 1-Year Total Return (%)    | -56.0%         |
| Fiscal Year End            | December 31    |


Source: Bloomberg (as of January 27, 2026), \*Tadawul (as of January 27, 2026); Note: FO is foreign ownership

### Key Financial Data and Estimates

| GROUP            | 2024  | 2025e | 2026e  |
|------------------|-------|-------|--------|
| GVM (SARmn)      | 6,542 | 7,211 | 9,749  |
| GOV (SARmn)      | 7,024 | 9,172 | 12,224 |
| Net Rev. (SARmn) | 2,219 | 2,295 | 3,204  |
| EPS (SAR)        | 0.92  | 0.89  | 0.99   |
| P/E (x)          | 16.08 | 16.65 | 14.88  |
| EV/EBITDA (x)    | 8.97  | 12.71 | 9.62   |
| DPS (SAR)        | 0.00  | 0.00  | 0.00   |
| DY (%)           | 0.0%  | 0.0%  | 0.0%   |

Source: Company data, QNB FS Research

### Company Evaluation Snapshot



Source: QNB FS Research; Note: Ranked from perceived weakest (1) to strongest (5) quality

### Phibion Makuwerere, CFA

+974 4476 6589

[phibion.makuwerere@qnbs.com.qa](mailto:phibion.makuwerere@qnbs.com.qa)

### Saugata Sarkar, CFA, CAIA

+974 4476 6534

[saugata.sarkar@qnbs.com.qa](mailto:saugata.sarkar@qnbs.com.qa)

## Contents

|   |    |
|---|----|
| <i>Contents</i> .....   | 2  |
| <i>Valuation Overview</i> .....   | 3  |
| Valuation Models Overview .....   | 3  |
| DCF Model.....  | 3  |
| Relative Valuation .....  | 5  |
| <i>Overview of Value Drivers</i> .....  | 8  |
| Jahez's Major Revenue Sources .....   | 8  |
| What Is Expected To Drive Value?.....   | 10 |
| <i>Industry Dynamics &amp; The Competitive Landscape</i> .....                              | 14 |
| Two-Horse Market, But Rails Are Shaking: From Duopoly/Triopoly to Four-firm Oligopoly ..... | 14 |
| Key Competitor Analysis – The Battle for Dominance .....                                    | 14 |
| GCC Regional Landscape & Outlook .....  | 17 |
| Subjective Competitive Strength Analysis Map .....  | 19 |
| Major Risks and Challenges .....  | 19 |
| <i>Sustainability &amp; ESG</i> .....   | 21 |
| <i>Company Overview</i> .....   | 22 |
| <i>Ownership, Organizational Structure &amp; Management</i> .....                           | 24 |
| <i>Financial Statements &amp; Projections</i> .....   | 26 |
| Income Statement.....   | 26 |
| Balance Sheet .....   | 26 |
| Cash flow Statement.....  | 26 |
| Ratios .....  | 27 |

## Valuation Overview

- We value Jahez shares at a 12M PT of SAR18 with a 21.7% upside potential from a blend of discounted cashflow and relative valuation models, assigning 60/40 weights, respectively. We acknowledge that valuing companies is complex: we take a pragmatic approach that combines both a cash flow-based (economic reality of an asset) and market perception-based approaches to determine our estimate of fair value. That captures both the intrinsic value of Jahez's cash flows and the market's view on the sector. Our view sits in the 1<sup>st</sup> quartile of sell-side PT range, from the most bullish SAR37.40 to the more cautious SAR13.50. We assign the biggest weight to DCF (cash flows to firm) as we believe it better captures the longer-term potential of the company.

### Valuation Summary

| Method  | Weight in Overall Jahez Valuation | Jahez Upside Potential |
|---|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| DCF   | 50%                               | 9.0%                   |
| EEM   | 10%                               | 35.7%                  |
| International/Industry Comparison                         | 20%                               | 48.5%                  |
| P/E, 2026e  | 5.0%                              | 12.6%                  |
| EV/EBITDA, 2026e  | 5.0%                              | 64.0%                  |
| P/E, 2027e  | 5.0%                              | 76.2%                  |
| EV/EBITDA, 2027e  | 5.0%                              | 41.2%                  |
| Local Comparison  | 20%                               | 24.7%                  |
| Tadawul P/E, 2026e  | 10.0%                             | 17.4%                  |
| Tadawul P/E, 2027e  | 10.0%                             | 32.0%                  |
| <b>Weighted Average Upside Potential for Jahez Shares</b> | <b>100.0%</b>                     | <b>21.7%</b>           |
|   | <b>PT:</b>                        | <b>18.00</b>           |

Source: QNBFS Research

- Overall, Jahez represents a unique story of a local tech champion scaling up in a lucrative market while maintaining/defending profitability. We note a decent margin of safety still exists as unit economics (EBITDA/order) remains positive. The company's strengths in execution, ecosystem building, and financial discipline give it an edge in navigating the competitive waves that characterize the food delivery industry. Our initiation with an Outperform rating reflects confidence in Jahez's fundamentals and medium-term upside potential. We will look for continued delivery on growth and margin improvements in coming quarters as validation of our thesis. Investors in Jahez should be prepared for stock volatility (typical of the sector) but can take comfort in the company's underlying resilience and growth runway. We recommend buying the stock at current levels with a 12M PT of SAR18. Early-year anecdotes point to a more rational pricing backdrop, reinforcing our view that the worst is likely behind us. Conversely, signs of renewed price wars or strategic missteps would cause us to reconsider our stance. For now, however, Jahez appears set to "deliver" value for shareholders, leveraging its platform strengths to ride the continued growth of online delivery in Saudi and beyond.

## Valuation Models Overview



### DCF Model

- DCF & EEM Analysis (60% weight): we forecast explicit free cash flows for 2025–2030, reflecting the company's robust growth and improving margins, and assume a terminal growth rate of 3.5% beyond 2030. We use a Cost of Equity 11.4% and no debt (100% equity financing), arriving at a WACC of 11.4%. Our WACC embeds a risk-free rate of 5.4% (US 10-year treasury yield+Saudi sovereign debt CDS), equity risk premium of 6.0%, and beta of 1.0. Weighted DCF and EEM models yield an equity value of ~SAR17/share for Jahez (implying 17x 2026e P/E). We have consolidated Snoonu into the group model. We have four separate revenue models for each market (Saudi, Qatar/Snoonu, Kuwait, and Bahrain) that we aggregate before deriving gross profit. The revenue forecasts are underpinned by a logistic model that incorporates some of the following variables: population dynamics, App penetration & active users, market share, average order size (AOV), delivery fee, take rate, ads, promo leakage, food inflation, etc. Central to our modeling – given 2Q and 3Q trends – we are incorporating near-term market share/margin loss to the newcomer Keeta. However, offsetting that, we see margin improvement in the medium term as Jahez expands the monetization of its platform plus margin gains emanating from its growing in-house logistics unit. Overall, our modeling

assumes that Jahez will move from a phase characterized by aggressive geographic expansion and user acquisition to one defined by unit economic optimization, vertical integration, and the deepening of monetization layers such as advertising technology, subscription ecosystems, and expanding into general Q-commerce.

**DCF Model Output Summary**

| GROUP                                    | 2025E                | 2026E              | 2027E              | 2028E              | 2029E              | 2030E              | Terminal            |
|--|----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| <b>NOPLAT</b>                            | <b>133,443,149</b>   | <b>170,859,254</b> | <b>199,918,201</b> | <b>232,568,299</b> | <b>268,390,020</b> | <b>308,687,761</b> | <b>319,491,833</b>  |
| EBIT                                     | 138,510,399          | 176,233,829        | 206,389,179        | 240,183,685        | 277,241,303        | 318,887,513        |                     |
| Zakat                                    | 5,067,250            | 5,374,575          | 6,470,979          | 7,615,385          | 8,851,283          | 10,199,752         |                     |
| <b>Reinvestment</b>                      | <b>1,857,646</b>     | <b>21,951,045</b>  | <b>81,335,455</b>  | <b>40,495,407</b>  | <b>48,289,950</b>  | <b>41,811,204</b>  | <b>(83,287,683)</b> |
| <b>Free cash flow to the firm (FCFF)</b> | <b>135,300,795</b>   | <b>192,810,299</b> | <b>281,253,656</b> | <b>273,063,706</b> | <b>316,679,971</b> | <b>350,498,965</b> | <b>236,204,149</b>  |
| WACC                                     | 11.37%               | 11.37%             | 11.37%             | 11.37%             | 11.37%             | 11.37%             | 11.37%              |
| Discount Factor                          | 1.06                 | 1.18               | 1.31               | 1.46               | 1.62               | 1.81               | 2.01                |
| <b>PV of FFCF</b>                        | <b>128,208,691</b>   | <b>164,052,021</b> | <b>214,873,951</b> | <b>187,319,854</b> | <b>195,062,894</b> | <b>193,854,124</b> | <b>117,303,255</b>  |
| <b>Sum of PV of FCFF</b>                 | <b>1,083,371,534</b> |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| <b>Terminal Value</b>                    | <b>1,542,802,905</b> |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| Terminal FCF                             | 121,408,869          |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| Terminal Growth Rate                     | 3.5%                 |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| Terminal WACC                            | 11.4%                |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| <b>Enterprise value</b>                  | <b>2,626,174,440</b> |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| +Cash and cash equivalents               | 409,257,525          |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| +Investment portfolio                    | 68,296,898           |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| -Interest bearing debt                   | 43,550,822           |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| -Other obligations                       | 23,007,954           |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| <b>Fair Value of Equity</b>              | <b>3,037,170,086</b> |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| Shares o/s                               | 209,836,060          |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| <b>12M target price per share</b>        | <b>16.12</b>         |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |
| <b>12 Month Upside Potential</b>         | <b>9.0%</b>          |                    |                    |                    |                    |                    |                     |



Source: QNBFS Research

**Target Share Price Sensitivity to WACC and Terminal Growth Rate**

| Terminal Discount Rate | Terminal Growth Rate |       |       |       |       |
|------------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                        | 2.50%                | 3.00% | 3.5%  | 4.00% | 4.50% |
| 9.4%                   | 17.73                | 18.12 | 18.57 | 19.09 | 19.70 |
| 10.4%                  | 16.62                | 16.87 | 17.16 | 17.47 | 17.83 |
| 11.4%                  | 15.77                | 15.94 | 16.12 | 16.32 | 16.53 |
| 12.4%                  | 15.11                | 15.22 | 15.33 | 15.45 | 15.58 |
| 13.4%                  | 14.59                | 14.65 | 14.72 | 14.79 | 14.85 |


| Upside Potential | Terminal Growth Rate |       |       |       |       |
|------------------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                  | 2.5%                 | 3.0%  | 3.5%  | 4.0%  | 4.5%  |
| 10.4%            | 19.9%                | 22.5% | 25.6% | 29.1% | 33.2% |
| 10.9%            | 12.4%                | 14.1% | 16.0% | 18.1% | 20.6% |
| 11.4%            | 6.7%                 | 7.8%  | 9.0%  | 10.3% | 11.8% |
| 11.9%            | 2.2%                 | 2.9%  | 3.7%  | 4.5%  | 5.3%  |
| 12.4%            | -1.4%                | -0.9% | -0.5% | 0.0%  | 0.4%  |

Source: QNBFS Research

**EEM Model Output: Summary**

| GROUP                      | 2025E       | 2026E         | 2027E                          | 2028E       | 2029E       | 2030E       | Terminal    |  |  |
|----------------------------|-------------|---------------|--------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--|--|
| EBITDA                     | 204,886,989 | 245,730,054   | 243,656,918                    | 276,617,788 | 312,890,260 | 353,882,283 | 366,268,163 |  |  |
| PV of EBITDA               | 194,147,364 | 209,078,623   | 186,150,557                    | 189,757,930 | 192,728,575 | 195,725,371 | 181,895,398 |  |  |
| Sum of PV of FCFF          |             | 1,083,371,534 | EEM Enterprise Value Breakdown |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Terminal Value             |             | 2,285,865,877 |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Terminal EBITDA            |             | 188,261,737   |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| EBITDA Multiple            |             | 12.1          |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Enterprise value           |             | 3,369,237,412 |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| +Cash and cash equivalents |             | 409,257,525   |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| +Investment portfolio      |             | 68,296,898    |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| -Interest bearing debt     |             | 43,550,822    |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| -Other obligations         |             | 23,007,954    |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Fair Value of Equity       |             | 3,780,233,058 |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Shares outstanding         |             | 209,836,060   |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Fair Value Per Share       |             | 18.015        |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| 12M Target price per share |             | 20.06         |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |
| Upside Potential           |             | 35.7%         |                                |             |             |             |             |  |  |

Source: QNBFS Research


**Target Share Price Sensitivity to Exit Multiple and WACC**

|                        |       | Exit Multiple |       |       |       |       |
|------------------------|-------|---------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|                        |       | 10.1          | 11.1  | 12.1  | 13.1  | 14.1  |
| Terminal Discount Rate | 9.4%  | 17.74         | 18.72 | 19.70 | 20.68 | 21.67 |
|                        | 10.4% | 17.90         | 18.89 | 19.88 | 20.87 | 21.86 |
|                        | 11.4% | 18.07         | 19.06 | 20.06 | 21.06 | 22.06 |
|                        | 12.4% | 18.23         | 19.24 | 20.24 | 21.25 | 22.26 |
|                        | 13.4% | 18.39         | 19.41 | 20.42 | 21.44 | 22.46 |
|                        |       |               |       |       |       |       |
| Upside Potential       |       | 10.1          | 11.1  | 12.1  | 13.1  | 14.1  |
| Terminal Discount Rate | 9.4%  | 19.9%         | 26.6% | 33.2% | 39.9% | 46.5% |
|                        | 10.4% | 21.0%         | 27.7% | 34.4% | 41.1% | 47.8% |
|                        | 11.4% | 22.1%         | 28.9% | 35.7% | 42.4% | 49.2% |
|                        | 12.4% | 23.2%         | 30.1% | 36.9% | 43.7% | 50.5% |
|                        | 13.4% | 24.3%         | 31.2% | 38.1% | 45.0% | 51.8% |
|                        |       |               |       |       |       |       |

Source: QNBFS Research


**Relative Valuation**

- Comparables Analysis (40% weight, split equally between industry peers (regional & international) and local equity market comparison): We benchmark Jahez against industry peers (both global delivery operators and regional consumer-tech peers). Global peers (Delivery Hero, Deliveroo, DoorDash, etc) trade at an average ~20x 2026e EV/EBITDA and ~42x 2026e P/E. Meanwhile, the closest regional peer UAE's Talabat (Delivery Hero) is valued at ~9x 2026e EV/EBITDA and ~13x 2026e P/E – reflecting its larger scale and healthy dividend payout but lower growth. Jahez currently trades at ~10x 2026e EV/EBITDA and ~15x 2026e P/E on our estimates, a modest premium to Talabat's implied multiples. We believe a modest premium is justified by Jahez's higher growth and proven profitability, but a large gap is not warranted given Talabat's broader footprint and dividend yield. Applying a trimmed blended peer multiple (between Talabat and global average) of ~16x EV/EBITDA and ~17x P/E to Jahez's 2026e earnings, we derive a relative value of ~SAR22 per share. **This suggests the market may be underestimating Jahez's ability to grow earnings in a normalized competitive environment.** We also benchmark Jahez against the Tadawul, from a P/E perspective – the Tadawul sports 2026e ~17x P/E.

**Peer Group**

| Company                     | Country       | Share price (LCY) | Mcap \$mn  | P/E<br>2026e | P/E<br>2027e | EV/EBITDA<br>2026e | EV/EBITDA<br>2027e | Div. Yield (%)<br>2026e | Div. Yield (%)<br>2027e |
|-----------------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| TALABAT HOLDING PLC         | UAE           | 0.956             | 6,093.11   | 13.08        | 13.08        | 8.77               | 8.45               | 6.88                    | 7.26                    |
| DELIVERY HERO SE            | GERMANY       | 26.66             | 9,591.59   | N/A          | 93.54        | 10.85              | 9.35               | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| MEITUAN-CLASS B             | CHINA         | 97.85             | 76,658.26  | N/A          | 86.68        | N/A                | 37.54              | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| DOORDASH INC - A            | UNITED STATES | 207.36            | 89,371.85  | 40.52        | 35.91        | 31.43              | 24.09              | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC       | UNITED STATES | 81.24             | 168,802.94 | 16.75        | 21.15        | 19.65              | 15.63              | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| LYFT INC-A                  | UNITED STATES | 17.54             | 7,154.29   | 14.28        | 11.46        | 11.94              | 8.92               | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| DIDI GLOBAL INC             | CHINA         | 4.86              | 22,629.92  | 42.67        | 15.31        | 19.60              | 12.14              | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| GRAB HOLDINGS LTD - CL A    | SINGAPORE     | 4.69              | 19,107.71  | 117.25       | 46.90        | 28.86              | 19.81              | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| ETERNAL LTD                 | INDIA         | 261.15            | 27,492.03  | 597.60       | 113.64       | 215.94             | 68.51              | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| SWIGGY LTD                  | INDIA         | 318.1             | 9,575.45   | N/A          | N/A          | N/A                | N/A                | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| HELLOFRESH SE               | GERMANY       | 5.634             | 1,073.89   | N/A          | 10.53        | 3.16               | 3.02               | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |
| JUST EAT TAKEAWAY           | NETHERLANDS   | N/A               | N/A        | N/A          | N/A          | N/A                | N/A                | N/A                     | N/A                     |
| Peer Group Mean             |               | 39,777.4          | 120.31     | 44.82        | 38.91        | 20.74              | 6.88               | 7.26                    |                         |
| Peer Group Median           |               | 19,107.71         | 40.52      | 28.53        | 19.60        | 13.88              | 0.00               | 0.00                    |                         |
| Peer Group Median (Trimmed) |               | 22,629.92         | 16.75      | 21.15        | 15.77        | 12.14              | 0.00               | 0.00                    |                         |
| JAHEZ INTERNATIONAL CO      | SAUDI ARABIA  | 14.79             | 827.59     | 14.88        | 12.01        | 9.62               | 8.60               | 0.00                    | 0.00                    |


Source: Bloomberg, QNBFS Research

**Jahez Looks Attractive in a Global Context, But at a Premium to Regional Peer Talabat**


Source: Bloomberg, QNBFS Research; Note: Bubble size represents mkt cap in dollars


- Balancing the two approaches, we set our 12-month PT at SAR18.** This target equates to ~18x 2026e PE and ~12x 2026e EV/EBITDA, seemingly palatable for a company with ~17% earnings CAGR (2024-29) and double-digit ROE. We initiate coverage on Jahez with an Outperform recommendation: while not a deep value play, the stock's risk-reward skew is favorable for long-term investors, in our view. Upside to our valuation could materialize from faster-than-expected margin gains or successful expansion into new markets (organically or via further acquisitions). Conversely, key downside risks include a re-escalation of price wars or execution stumbles. Our base case assumes a gradual normalization of competitive behavior and the realization of planned efficiency gains; any deviance from this trajectory will impact valuation accordingly.

**Jahez Share Price Action Vs. Peers (Base = 09/12/2024): Sector-Wide Pressure**



*Source:* Bloomberg, QNBFS Research

**Jahez Share Price Action Vs. Tadawul Show General Market Weakness at Play**




*Source:* Bloomberg, QNBFS Research

## Overview of Value Drivers

In this section we review how Jahez creates value and discuss how we see it sustaining its value-creation process. Overall, Jahez creates value through its tech-driven online food delivery and quick-commerce platform. This platform, where customers/merchants order/buy/sell products, enables Jahez to generate revenue/income primarily as some function/percentage of the value of products/goods sold on the platform: the aggregate value of products/goods sold on the platform is usually referred to as gross merchandise value (GMV). Since 2017, the group increased the number of orders on its platform from approximately one million to 106mn in 2024. Meanwhile, GMV increased from SAR3,343mn in 2021 to SAR6,542mn in 2024, while the number of merchants on the Jahez Platform rose from an average of 7.2k to more than 17k merchants during the same period. It has been particularly popular among SME restaurants and trendy local brands, while HungerStation (biggest Saudi peer) historically had more of the large chains. To bolster selection, Jahez in 2023–25 onboarded key national chains (e.g. popular quick service restaurants) sometimes with incentives. For instance, in 2Q2025 Jahez temporarily waived or reduced commission for certain large chains to get them on a special subscription promotion for customers. Such a move helps to bring back users and should pay off longer-term in customer retention. Also, Jahez's acquisition of The Chefz (2022) – a boutique app specializing in high-end restaurants and confectionery – has enhanced its merchant portfolio at the premium end.

**53% Orders Vs. 47% GMV Vs. 44% Total Active Users CAGR Between 2020-24**



Source: Company data

We start off by reviewing Jahez's major sources of revenue/income, which can be viewed primarily through two lenses: **(1) by tariff/fee/product line, and (2) by geography**. This is followed by an analysis of four primary ways that will help Jahez sustain its value creation process: **(1) differentiation, (2) logistics optimization, (3) adjacent verticals, and (4) M&A and the Snoonu acquisition**.


### Jahez's Major Revenue Sources

The following tariff/fee/product lines form Jahez's major revenue sources:

- Commissions charged to merchants on Jahez's platform
- Delivery fees charged to customers ordering/buying on its platform
- E-payment fees
- Advertising & marketing
- Subscription fees

We forecast that Jahez's GMV/revenue will grow at a CAGR of 16.0%/15.7% between 2024-29. We expect GMV to be driven by platform user growth, which in turn is a function of population growth, income levels, app penetration levels, inflation, competition, etc. While we see the primary revenue drivers (delivery fees and commissions) remaining intact in the medium term despite near term competition pressures, we believe the next phase of growth for Jahez is at an inflection point. **The group is moving from a phase of aggressive geographic expansion and user acquisition to one defined by unit economic optimization, vertical integration, and the deepening of monetization layers such as advertising technology and subscription ecosystems.** While user growth will naturally decelerate as app penetration rates in the GCC approach saturation ceilings, the compounding value of increased order frequency, optimized take rates, and the maturation of high-margin "merchant services" will support GMV and revenue expansion.


**Broad-based Solid Revenue Growth Expected – Advertising Growth Stands-Out**



Source: Company data, QNBFS Research

- Geographically, the Saudi Platform (core marketplace) generates bulk of the revenue, where in FY2024, it accounted for about 90% of total revenue. At the bottom line, Saudi's contribution is even bigger and subsidizes the group's organic expansion into Kuwait and Bahrain. However, the Snoonu (Qatar) acquisition should help balance the scales, as that operation is already profitable.

**Revenue by Geography (SARmn) – Qatar's Snoonu Set to be the 2<sup>nd</sup> Biggest Revenue Contributor**



Source: Company data, QNBFS Research; Note: 2024/25 is pro forma data (inc. Snoonu)

- We forecast the blended take-rate (net revenue/GMV) to dip in 2025/6 to 31.8%/32.9% from 33.9% in 2024 (due to promotions to counter competition) then start to gradually rise as ad monetization and commission tweaks take effect. We forecast EBITDA/GMV margin to dip to 2.9%/2.6% in 2025/6 from 3.4% in 2024 amid ongoing price competition, then recover to 2.9% by 2029, as cost per order declines (via Logi) and supporting streams grow. Looking forward, we still expect the Saudi segment and the newly acquired Snoonu (Qatari operation) to drive growth, on the back of moderating volume (orders) and growing ancillary income streams.


Our model assumes Saudi/Qatar orders grow at ~5%/14% CAGR (2024–29). With blended take-rate improvements, we estimate Saudi/Qatar GMV growing at CAGR ~6%/15% and revenue CAGR is ~5%/13%.

### What Is Expected To Drive Value?

The four themes identified above that we forecast to drive Jahez's value for the foreseeable future are (1) differentiation, (2) logistics optimization, (3) adjacent verticals, and (4) M&A and the Snoonu acquisition.

1. **Defending home turf with differentiation:** In Saudi Arabia – Jahez's core market (~70% of 2024 pro forma revenue incl. Snoonu/Qatar) – the strategy centers on defending and modestly expanding its market share without racing to the bottom on price. **Management has emphasized a focus on more affluent, loyalty-driven customers rather than engaging in ruinous discount wars.** With its subscription loyalty program (unlimited free deliveries for a monthly fee), Jahez has been effective in locking-in higher-value users and mitigating churn to competitors. While Keeta's entry has provoked heavy promotions industry-wide, Jahez has selectively countered with tactical campaigns (e.g. subscription bundles, onboarding popular restaurant chains at its own cost) to defend market share – but crucially avoided across-the-board price cuts. We note, though, that while order volumes stayed positive YT-9M2025, they declined in 3Q YoY for the first time since at least the last seven quarters, meaning competition is beginning to take its toll. However, we are confident that management can respond well to the fast-changing market dynamics. Jahez's **calibrated approach suggests it will invest in marketing when needed but aims to preserve its "quality" brand positioning (reliable service, wide selection) to justify standard delivery fees and higher user stickiness.** Additionally, Jahez is expanding into underserved cities and regions outside the big metropolitan areas. **By leveraging its existing platform and logistics, the company can tap secondary Saudi cities with less competition, fueling incremental order growth.** This geographic expansion, combined with rising penetration of non-food categories (grocery, etc.), underpins our expectation that Jahez can outpace overall market growth in Saudi by a small margin, even as the market leader (HungerStation) fights back and Mrsool is a formidable force.

### Quarterly Orders Have Decline YoY During 3Q3035 For The First Time In At Least Seven Quarters




Source: Company data, QNBFS Research

2. **Logistics as a strategic asset:** A cornerstone of Jahez's strategy is its **Logi** logistics arm – a wholly-owned subsidiary that provides last-mile delivery fulfillment. Logi delivery business comprises of in-house fleet operations, some of which generate inter-company revenue. In financial reporting, a portion of delivery fees from customers is offset by costs in Logi, but if Logi provides delivery services to external parties, that will show up as revenue. **Unlike many peers who rely mostly on third-party fleets, Jahez began investing in its own driver network in 2021, and by 2024 Logi handled ~42% of Jahez orders with ~3.8k active drivers.** By 9M2025, Logi's fleet increased to ~4k drivers though its share deliveries strangely declined to 35% during 3Q2025. This hybrid model gives Jahez significant flexibility: it can route orders through its fleet to reduce costs and ensure quality where volume is dense, while still using third-party couriers in peak times or

remote areas. , since early 2024, the average cost per order via Logi fell below that of 3PL providers, thanks to scale efficiencies and technology optimizations (better batching and routing).

### Logi per order cost vs. 3PL evolution


jahez Logi Group



Logi delivery costs have significantly decreased with scale, reaching levels lower than 3PL  
Extracted from: Company FY2024 presentation

- Jahez will continue to invest in Logi (fleet, tech) as a competitive moat – it not only boosts profitability but could evolve into a B2B offering itself (providing delivery-as-a-service to external merchants in the future). For modeling, we implicitly incorporate Logi benefits as reduced cost of revenue (hence improving margins), a key driver of our margin expansion thesis. Increasing Logi's share of deliveries directly improves gross margins – a trend we forecast to continue. Management's target is to push in-house delivery to at least 60% of orders in the medium- to long-term. Furthermore, Logi helps Jahez maintain service quality (delivery times, reliability) and manage through industry challenges like driver shortages. Logi has also mitigated regulatory risks, for example by maintaining a larger pool of drivers on flexible contracts, reducing the chance of shortages when labor rules changed. For example, new labor regulations in 2023 briefly constrained the gig driver supply, but Logi's model (combining employed drivers and contractors) allowed Jahez to navigate without major service disruption.

### Decent Margin of Safety: Unit Economics EBITDA/Order (SAR) Remains Positive, Down YoY



Source: Company data, QNBFS Research

3. **Focus on adjacent verticals (Q-commerce, B2B, Ads):** Jahez's strategy extends beyond restaurants into becoming a broader commerce platform. Key initiatives include:
  - **Quick Commerce (PIK):** Jahez introduced the PIK vertical in 2020 to facilitate ultra-fast delivery of groceries, pharmaceuticals, and retail essentials. Rather than operating proprietary dark stores (which require heavy capex and inventory risk), Jahez partners with existing supermarkets and convenience stores, integrating their inventory into the app – it recently went into partnerships with two dark store operators, Noon and Doos. This marketplace approach to Q-commerce allows Jahez to offer <60-minute grocery delivery without the fixed costs that burden peers attempting the dark store model. As of 2025, non-food categories are still a small portion of GMV but growing rapidly – grocery GVM grew 2.7x YoY. In Snoonu's case, grocery/retail deliveries are rising as a share of orders, indicating strong demand in affluent segments. Jahez is replicating this by signing up major grocery chains and working on real-time inventory integrations. The goal is to boost order frequency – food delivery might be used a few times a week by a customer, but add groceries and suddenly the user engages almost daily. We see Q-commerce as a major growth avenue, even capturing a fraction of Saudi's grocery market online could add significantly to Jahez's GMV. By staying asset-light (not owning stores), Jahez can pursue this growth without eroding margins, positioning it well against players that have sunk costs into warehousing (Noon & Doos).
  - **Advertising & Fintech:** Jahez is actively monetizing its platform through advertising technology. It offers merchants paid slots for promoted listings, banner ads, and special campaigns within the app. By 2024, merchant advertising contributed ~4% of gross revenue, and this should inch up to ~5%+ by 2029 as the user base and merchant demand grow. The company rolled out a revamped app interface in 1H25 that increased ad inventory, and partnered with a third-party ad-tech firm to optimize sales of these placements. We view advertising revenue as near-100% margin and a key earnings lever ahead (each 1% of revenue from ads is equivalent to ~20 bps added to EBITDA margin). On the fintech side, Jahez obtained an e-payment license and launched its **JahezPay** services (allowing it to earn fees on transactions). E-payment fees made up ~5–6% of "Other revenues" in FY2024 and are growing as online payments penetration increases. This not only brings direct revenue but also enhances the ecosystem stickiness (e.g. stored wallet balances, loyalty points). Lastly, Jahez's acquisition of **Sol** (a B2B supplier marketplace for restaurants) and investments in merchant solutions indicate a broader strategy to become **indispensable to F&B merchants** – from sourcing ingredients (Sol) to food preparation (cloud kitchens via Co.) to delivery and advertising. By building this end-to-end value chain, Jahez can earn a share of additional profit pools and deepen merchant loyalty (making restaurants less inclined to leave the platform).
  - **Other Ventures:** Jahez's other initiatives (cloud kitchens, etc.) are in investment mode. The company acquired a stake in a cloud kitchen operation ("Co.") in 2020, which allows it to help popular restaurant brands expand via delivery-only kitchens – this supports the core platform by increasing food supply without traditional expansion constraints. **Sol** (acquired 2021) is a B2B platform connecting restaurants with suppliers (food ingredients, packaging). Sol's integration means Jahez can facilitate its merchant partners to procure supplies, possibly taking a cut or improving merchant stickiness. **Red Color** and **Marn** are other tech investments; one is a digital marketing firm and the other a POS software, aligning with Jahez's ecosystem approach. Financially, these ventures are small (likely contributing <1% of revenue each), but they have strategic value.
  - In sum, the Logistics & Other segment underscores Jahez's vertical integration philosophy – controlling critical parts of the value chain to enhance the core marketplace and extract additional value. **Over our forecast, we assume no major revenue from new verticals (to be prudent), but any breakthrough (say, Sol growing into a significant B2B marketplace) could surprise on the upside.** The main financial contribution of this segment in our model is via cost savings (Logi) and a slight uptick in other revenues (ads, etc.). We forecast "ancillary" revenues (ads, e-pay, etc.) to grow ~17% CAGR, reaching ~15% of total revenues by 2029 from ~12% in 2024, which aligns with management's statements on ramping adtech and fintech streams.
4. **M&A and Snoonu as regional playbook:** Management has signaled that the "Snoonu model" – partnering with or acquiring a strong local player – could be replicated in other GCC countries. The immediate focus is on successfully integrating Snoonu in Qatar. Jahez intends to keep Snoonu's brand and leadership (the founder retains 23.4% and is CEO), a strategic imperative given the local brand equity. Integration will revolve around sharing technology (Jahez's platform know-how) and cross-pollinating merchants and talent. **Jahez will use**

**Snoonu as a beachhead to potentially expand into Oman or the UAE next.** The UAE market is larger but competitive (entrenched players like Talabat, Deliveroo, Careem); a logical entry could be via acquiring or partnering with a niche player or focusing on a niche (e.g. only high-end restaurants or grocery). Another white space is Oman, where no single app dominates – a partnership there could pre-empt competition. While no deals are imminent, Jahez's healthy cash (and access to Saudi capital markets) provides the firepower for opportunistic expansions. **Our valuation does not assume any further M&A beyond Snoonu; thus any accretive expansion could offer upside.** We do note that Jahez will be mindful of not over-stretching – management is focused on turning around its existing international segments (Kuwait and Bahrain). In summary, Jahez's strategy balances consolidating its Saudi base and selectively planting flags abroad to become a top regional aggregator. This two-pronged approach is prudent and, if executed well, should cement Jahez's position as a leading regional player in the coming years.

**Key Performance Indicators and Trends**

|  | 2023  | 2024  | 2025E | 2026E | 2027E  |
|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Gross Merchandise Value (GMV) (SAR'mn) | 5,093 | 6,542 | 7,211 | 9,749 | 10,366 |
| Net revenue (SAR'mn)                   | 1,785 | 2,219 | 2,295 | 3,204 | 3,440  |
| Number of Orders (mn)                  | 84.8  | 106   | 112   | 143   | 151    |
| Total Active Users (mn)                | 3.50  | 4.30  | 4.53  | 5.20  | 5.33   |
| Average Order Value (AOV) (SAR)        | 60.06 | 61.72 | 64.24 | 68.06 | 68.62  |
| Average commission per order (SAR)     | 8.13  | 9.03  | 10.19 | 11.52 | 11.56  |
| Take Rate (Commission Rate)            | 13.5% | 14.6% | 15.9% | 16.9% | 16.8%  |
| Blended Take Rate (Net Revenue/GMV)    | 35%   | 34%   | 32%   | 33%   | 33%    |
| Average orders per customer            | 24.2  | 24.7  | 24.8  | 27.5  | 28.3   |
| Average delivery fees per order (SAR)  | 12.31 | 10.69 | 9.13  | 9.75  | 9.87   |

*Source:* Company data, QNBFS Research

- The above table illustrates how Jahez's growth is shifting from purely adding users to increasing usage and value per user. Average orders per customer rose steadily through 2024, reflecting successful engagement strategies, though we temper this in 2025 due to some churn from aggressive competition. We also see the in-house logistics (Logi) share climbing, which, should correlate with cost per order improvements.

## Industry Dynamics & The Competitive Landscape


### Booming Food Delivery Market in KSA

Saudi Arabia's online food delivery sector has been one of the fastest-growing in the world, fueled by high disposable incomes, extreme climatic conditions (necessitating indoor delivery services), a young urban population, female workforce participation, high smartphone & fintech penetration, improving logistics infrastructure, and pandemic-driven adoption. The market's inflection point came in 2020–2021: the average daily orders surged from ~117,000 in late 2019 to ~525,000 by late 2021, as COVID-19 served as a structural break, accelerating adoption curves by years and transforming delivery from a luxury convenience into essential infrastructure. GMV of online food orders jumped 5x from ~SAR310mn per month in 4Q 2019 to ~SAR1.75bn per month by 4Q 2021. Post-pandemic, the battleground has shifted from simple geographic expansion to "Quick Commerce" (Q-commerce), vertical integration (cloud kitchens), and unit economic optimization. Consensus is that double-digit growth will continue through mid-2020s albeit at a calmer pace than the pandemic frenzy as the fundamental drivers remain in place. Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, which encourages digital services and smart-city initiatives, also bodes well for the sector. The market is seen evolving from a simple delivery service into a comprehensive lifestyle ecosystem, heavily influenced by "Quick Commerce" (Q-commerce) and government digital initiatives. The market is projected to grow at a CAGR of between 9% and 18.4% through 2030. Conservative estimates project market value of \$8.2bn by 2030, up from ~\$3bn in 2024. More optimistic estimates project \$13–17bn market size by 2030 (when including broader delivery categories like grocery and Q-commerce).

### Two-Horse Market, But Rails Are Shaking: From Duopoly/Triopoly to Four-firm Oligopoly

The Saudi food delivery market operates as a high-stakes oligopoly. Pre-2020, Saudi's market was a near-duopoly dominated by Germany-owned Delivery Hero operating as **HungerStation** and a distant second **Jahez**. HungerStation, launched 2012, enjoyed first-mover advantage and held ~65% market share in 2019. Jahez at that time was around ~13%, rising to ~30% by 2021. The landscape shifted dramatically with the rise of **Mrsool** – an independent startup offering a unique peer-to-peer model – and the influx of new apps post-2020. Mrsool's niche on-demand courier approach vaulted it to prominence in a short space of time. This seismic shift turned the market into a **three-horse race** by 2022: Mrsool, HungerStation, Jahez. While HungerStation appears to retain the lead in market share and profitability, Jahez has successfully cemented its 2<sup>nd</sup> place status as a "national champion", leveraging high Saudization rates and vertical integration to secure robust profitability and operational resilience. In 2024, the two leaders generated a combined net profit exceeding USD 100 million, a rarity in the global delivery sector which is often plagued by cash burn.<sup>1</sup> However, since 2024 this duopolistic stability is being tested by a new challenger, Chinese-owned Meituan operating as **Keeta**, which captured approximately 8-10% of order volume within months of its launch through aggressive price subsidies and algorithmic efficiency. So far, Keeta has had the effect of expanding the market and/or taking market share from small players with contained impact on the big players. We should see more smaller players either exit (e.g. Shghadi) or acquired, should Keeta maintain a hold onto its ~10% market share. That transforms the market to a four-firm oligopoly + "long" tail; with a four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) of >90% (i.e. >60%) making it a concentrated market, which bodes well for big players such as Jahez through higher pricing power and scale.

### Early Indications Show Keeta Doing More Harm To Smaller Players



### Key Competitor Analysis – The Battle for Dominance

The Saudi market is no longer a simple race for coverage; it is a complex battle involving differing business models, capital structures, and strategic end-games.

**HungerStation: The Entrenched Incumbent**

Ownership: Delivery Hero (Germany); which also operates "Talabat" in other GCC markets

Status: Market Leader

HungerStation is the Goliath of the Saudi market. Backed by the global resources of Delivery Hero, it benefits from shared technology, global best practices, and deep pockets.

- **Market Share:** Estimates place HungerStation's market share in the range of 37% to 40%, making it the largest player by volume. For now, HungerStation and Jahez are often the two apps mentioned as driving industry growth. HungerStation holds a slight edge in overall Saudi GMV due to its strength in high-order segments and wider network, but Jahez is closing the gap. HungerStation's key strength is its sheer scale and resources – it can roll out massive discount campaigns or deploy new features system-wide quickly. On the flip side, being part of a global company could limit local agility. As the market stabilizes, we forecast HungerStation and Jahez to continue a duopolistic-type rivalry (with Mrsool as an alternative model alongside). Both will likely benefit if the new Saudi competition regulations curb extreme discounting, since they have higher margins and would prefer to compete on service and selection rather than pure price.
- **Financials:** It is the most profitable aggregator in the Kingdom. In 2024, HungerStation generated \$57mn. This superior profitability (compared to Jahez's \$13M) is likely due to economies of scale—its massive order volume allows for better amortization of fixed costs and tech investments.
- **Strategy:** HungerStation focuses on "stickiness." Its **HPlus** subscription service offers free delivery, incentivizing high-frequency users to remain loyal to the platform. It has also aggressively expanded into groceries with its "Quick Market" dark store network, which covers 95% of the Kingdom's active areas.

**Keeta: The Algorithmic Disruptor**

Ownership: Meituan (China).

Status: Aggressive Challenger.

Keeta's entry in late 2024 has sent shockwaves through the Saudi/GCC market. Representing the international expansion of Meituan, the world's largest food delivery company, Keeta brings a sophisticated, data-driven approach honed in the hyper-competitive Chinese market. **Meituan exports an execution-heavy, subsidy-forward "density-first" model** — buying demand (consumer promos), saturating courier supply, then monetizing via ads/merchant services and instant retail. That playbook has proven it can win quickly (e.g., Keeta's rapid scale in Hong Kong, grabbing the biggest volume market share in less than a year), and it's now being redeployed in the Gulf while funding an entry into Brazil. **But the model is expensive when competition turns into a discounting arms race:** Meituan just reported its **first quarterly loss since 2022** (~RMB16bn adjusted net loss in 3Q2025; ~RMB 18.6bn net loss), driven by heavier subsidy intensity and competitive pressure in core China. **Implication for the playbook is that overseas expansion likely stays aggressive in go-to-market (promos + service guarantees), but is more likely to be tactically paced and ROI-disciplined if domestic losses persist** — because the market will eventually punish the "global land-grab + China price war" if it does not turn a profit.

- **Market Impact:** In a remarkably short period (less than 6 months), Keeta captured approximately 8% to 10% of the market volume, becoming the **3rd-largest** player in Saudi. This rapid growth signals a high latent demand for lower-priced options. Crucially, Keeta's presence expanded the total market (many small-ticket orders that wouldn't have happened without free delivery), and its gains mainly hurt the minor apps and less so the top two. Nonetheless, Keeta's arrival sent a chill through the industry, as reflected in Jahez's and Delivery Hero's stock drops since late 2024. The competitive concern is that a deep-pocketed player could incite a protracted price war, eroding margins sector-wide. However, there are early signs of rationality returning: Jahez management observed Keeta raising its take-rate from merchants and asking them to bear some subsidy costs – a signal that the new entrant cannot sustain cash burn indefinitely. This anecdotal evidence suggests that Keeta is facing the realities of the market. In markets like the UAE, Meituan's entry was similarly aggressive but eventually moderated. We also note Meituan's financial strain at home as it fights it out with even bigger players, Alibaba and JD.com – so it may not endlessly subsidize abroad. Additionally, any forthcoming Saudi regulations against selling below cost would directly curtail Keeta's playbook. As such, we forecast Keeta to remain a factor but not to upend the market beyond the immediate horizon. Jahez and HungerStation's incumbency, loyal user bases, and local knowledge give them an edge once subsidy-fueled frenzy dies down.
- **The "Blitzscaling" playbook:** Keeta's strategy is classic market disruption:
  - **Subsidies:** It entered the market with massive customer incentives, including free delivery and huge discounts on first orders. This "cash burn" strategy is designed to acquire users rapidly.

- **Unit economics:** Keeta appears to be targeting a slightly different demographic – single users and smaller baskets. Its lower AOV compared to incumbents suggests it is capturing the "coffee and burger" crowd rather than just large family dinners.
- **Tech advantage:** Meituan's dispatch algorithms are legendary for their efficiency. By batching orders more effectively, Keeta may be able to achieve lower delivery costs per unit, allowing them to sustain lower prices longer than competitors.

#### ***Mrsool: The "Everything" Store***

Ownership: Private (Saudi-founded).

Status: Niche Leader/Concierge.

Mrsool operates on a fundamentally different business model. It is not just a food aggregator; it is an on-demand courier service (concierge).

- **The Model:** Users can ask a courier (Star) to buy anything – from a specific restaurant to a spare part from a hardware store. The courier and the user can negotiate the delivery price via an in-app chat.
- **Market Position:** Mrsool consistently ranks as the third-largest player. While exact 2024 GMV figures are opaque, it reportedly logged SAR1bn+ GMV as far back as 2019. Its active user base exceeds 4mn, similar to Jahez. The key challenge for Mrsool is profitability: its model has lower take-rates (no fixed commissions, just a facilitation fee) and inherently higher per-order cost due to one-off routes. There are indications Mrsool has slowed its cash burn recently, but if it ever pursues an IPO, demonstrating sustainable margins will be critical. From Jahez's perspective, Mrsool is both a competitor and, interestingly, a complementary service – given Mrsool's open model, a restaurant might primarily partner with Jahez but still indirectly benefit from Mrsool orders. Thus, Jahez competes on user experience and merchant relationships to ensure it captures as many orders within its platform as possible, to limit customers defaulting to Mrsool for availability reasons.
- **Differentiation:** Mrsool's "open ecosystem" allows it to serve restaurants that are not officially signed up with Jahez or HungerStation. This gives it a massive virtual inventory. However, the lack of integration means less control over food quality and preparation times.
- **Strategic Pivot:** Mrsool is increasingly moving towards formal partnerships and Q-commerce to standardize its service and improve reliability, as the "wild west" courier model faces challenges from the optimized logistics of competitors.

#### ***Other Players (The Long Tail)***

- Beyond the big three (now "four"), the rest of the field in Saudi is fragmented. The Saudi regulator (CITC) issued 17 delivery app licenses by end-2021, leading to a flood of new entrants, but most of those startups have either shuttered, been acquired, or settled into small niches. As the industry matures, we foresee further consolidation – essentially a "**trio**poli or four-firm oligopoly + a long tail" structure. If anything, some global players without presence might eye entry; however, entering at this stage against entrenched locals would be challenging.
  - **To You** is one notable local app offering food, grocery and even ride-hailing; it gained some popularity around 2020 with aggressive discounts but is niche (single-digit market share).
  - **Careem** (Uber's Middle East subsidiary) dabbled in food delivery ("Careem Now") but has largely retreated by 2025.
  - **Talabat** itself has minor direct presence in Saudi (though it appears it operates in certain cities, possibly as an extension of HungerStation's network).
  - **The Chefz:** Focuses on the premium/gourmet segment, targeting higher AOV customers with fine dining options.
  - **Ninja:** A pure-play Q-commerce operator delivering groceries in under 20 minutes, competing directly with Jahez's PIK and HungerStation's Quick Market.

**Competitive Benchmark Matrix**

| Feature            | Jahez                               | HungerStation                | Mrsool                      | Keeta                   |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|
| Parent Company     | Jahez International (KSA)           | Delivery Hero (Germany)      | Mrsool Inc. (KSA)           | Meituan (China)         |
| Market Share (Vol) | ~30-34%                             | ~37-40%                      | ~15-18%                     | ~8-10% (Rising)         |
| Net Profit (2024)  | \$49Mn                              | \$57Mn                       | N/A                         | Loss-making (inv. mode) |
| Primary Model      | Integrated aggregator               | Integrated aggregator        | P2P courier / bidding       | Tech-aggregator         |
| Key Strength       | Local roots, Saudization, logistics | Network density, first mover | Flexibility, "buy anything" | Pricing, algorithms     |
| Strategic Focus    | Vertical integration (logi/PIK)     | Retention (HPlus)            | Q-commerce pivot            | User acquisition        |

*Source:* Company data, reseer.com, kenresearch.com, mordorintelligence.com, QNBF Research, etc.

**GCC Regional Landscape & Outlook**

- Outside Saudi, food delivery in the Gulf is also robust, though typically dominated by one or two players per country. Kuwait and Bahrain (where Jahez entered organically in 2022) are markets where Delivery Hero's Talabat is the long-standing leader. Jahez's presence in these two has been growing but from a small base – combined, they accounted for ~12% of Jahez's GMV in 2024. Encouragingly, Jahez has been improving margins in Kuwait/Bahrain as volumes scale, even achieving near break-even in 2024. The Qatar market, now relevant via Snoonu, has been led by Talabat as well (Talabat entered Qatar in 2010s and holds perhaps ~60%+ share). Snoonu, founded 2019, rose to the #2 spot by focusing on local preferences and broader services (it is termed a "super-app" offering not just food but courier, grocery, etc.). As of 2024, Snoonu's GMV was about half of Talabat's in Qatar, but its growth rate far exceeds Talabat's. Another Qatari app Rafeeq is a distant #3. With the Covid-19 and World Cup 2022 legacy boosting digital adoption, Qatar's market is attractive albeit smaller (population ~3 million). We estimate Qatar's delivery market size is roughly one-tenth of Saudi's by value. Jahez's Snoonu move immediately makes it a major player in Qatar and also provides valuable experience operating in a high GDP per capita environment with demanding customers., Snoonu targets affluent locals with high order frequency (7+ orders/month) and a high average order value. This niche is somewhat insulated from price competition – for instance, Jahez management does not expect Keeta's discount tactics to make a dent in Snoonu, since Snoonu's user base is less price-sensitive (Keeta might instead peel off business from Talabat among expat users). This dynamic in Qatar could foreshadow Jahez's strategy in other markets: focus on quality and niches (e.g. high-end restaurants, quick retail) rather than subsidy-driven mass market play. In the UAE, which Jahez has not entered yet, the landscape is crowded: Talabat (DH) and Deliveroo lead in food delivery, with Uber's Careem also present. It's a tougher market to crack due to existing competition and lower cultural barriers for international brands. If Jahez were to expand to UAE, it might do so via a partnership or acquisition (as hinted in strategy). The GCC as a whole is seeing convergence of food and e-commerce delivery – players are increasingly offering multi-category services to maximize utilization (e.g. Deliveroo and Talabat both deliver groceries and even consumer goods now, not just restaurant meals). Jahez is on-trend with this convergence via its PIK and Snoonu's model.
- The GCC on-demand delivery sector is maturing into an oligopolistic structure in each country, with rationality gradually returning after a period of frenzy. We forecast continued growth driven by habit persistence (post-pandemic, many consumers have permanently adopted app ordering), expansion into new categories (grocery, pharma), and broader geographic reach within countries (serving smaller cities). For Saudi, a mid-teens annual GMV growth in the next 2-3 years is feasible, decelerating to high-single digits by 2030 as penetration saturates. Profitability will become a greater focus for all players, which paradoxically could ease competitive pressure – a few years ago everyone chased growth at all costs, now with public markets in sight (Jahez and Talabat already listed, Mrsool perhaps eyeing one), investors demand a path to profits. Jahez stands well-positioned in this regard as it is already profitable and has levers to improve margins. On a regional scale, we see consolidation likely: weaker local startups might be acquired or shut, and giants like Delivery Hero, Jahez, and perhaps Meituan will split the region. The endgame may resemble other

markets where 2-3 players dominate and engage in more rational competition (similar to how Uber, DoorDash coexist in the US). Middle East logistics and digital infrastructure improvements (e.g. better maps, addresses, digital payments) also support the sector's efficiency gains. **One emerging trend is vertical integration vs platform approach** – some are building in-house grocery logistics (e.g. InstaShop by Delivery Hero) while others, like Jahez, use platform partners; it is to be seen which yields better ROI, but investors favor asset-light strategies for higher return on capital. Taking it all together, the industry is entering a new phase: still growing, but with a sharper eye on sustainability. Jahez, given its track record and strategic moves, is poised to be one of the long-term winners in the Saudi and GCC delivery space.

#### ***Emerging Strategic Frontiers: Q-Commerce, Cloud Kitchens and B2B***

The battle for the Saudi consumer is moving beyond simple food delivery. Future growth will be defined by success in adjacent verticals. With the food delivery market approaching saturation in Tier 1 cities, Q-commerce, cloud kitchens and B2B & corporate catering are new engines of growth.

- **The rise of Q-commerce:** The Saudi Q-commerce market is valued at \$0.45bn in 2024 and is projected to triple to \$1.34bn by 2030, growing at a CAGR of 20%.
  - **Jahez:** Through PIK, complemented by alliances with dark store operators (e.g. Noon, Doos), Jahez is positioning itself as a localized Amazon for immediate needs. By leveraging its existing fleet (Logi), it can offer delivery economics that pure-play retailers cannot match.
  - **HungerStation:** Its **Quick Market** utilizes a network of dark stores optimized for speed (under 20 minutes). This infrastructure-heavy approach offers better inventory control but higher capital risk compared to Jahez's marketplace approach with PIK.
- **Cloud Kitchens (The infrastructure layer):** As real estate costs in Riyadh and Jeddah rise, restaurants are turning to cloud kitchens.
  - **Co Kitchens (Jahez):** By investing in this vertical, Jahez becomes a landlord and infrastructure provider. This creates a "lock-in" effect – restaurants operating out of a Co Kitchen are inherently tied to Jahez's logistics network. This vertical integration is a defensive moat against competitors who only offer the app layer.
- **B2B & corporate catering:** An often-overlooked segment, the corporate segment is growing faster than the consumer segment.
  - **Jahez's edge:** With its strong government relations and compliant invoicing systems, Jahez is well-positioned to dominate the B2B catering market, supplying meals to government ministries and large corporate offices. This high-volume, recurring revenue stream acts as a buffer against consumer volatility.


#### ***Regulatory Environment***

- The regulatory stance is evolving to catch up with the sector's growth. Between March and April 2025, **Saudi Arabia's General Authority for Competition (GAC) opened public consultations on draft guidelines to enhance competition within the food delivery platform sector to prevent anti-competitive practices**. The draft specifically prohibits practices by dominant apps that disrupt fair competition, including predatory pricing, selling below cost, exclusive contracts that lock in merchants, arrangements, self-referencing due to vertical integration, and other vertical restraints. Moreover, GAC requested more data from all food delivery players as late as November on alleged predatory pricing practices, including detailed data for the past five years, to further enhance its eventual decision. **If implemented, possibly this year, these rules would significantly curb the ability of new entrants to "buy" market share**. It essentially enforces more rational competition, which would be *positive* for incumbents like Jahez that already operate profitably. Meanwhile, exclusivity/vertical restraints-banning rules could be a *negative*.
- Elsewhere in the GCC, regulations vary; most have basic consumer protection and labor laws for delivery, but not specific competition rules for this sector yet. We will monitor how Saudi's approach might set a precedent. On the labor side, new guidelines (like requiring better insurance and caps on working hours for drivers) have been introduced, which increase compliance costs somewhat. Jahez, with its partially employed fleet, likely will navigate these better than a pure gig platform. **Overall, regulation is becoming a double-edged sword: curbing predatory pricing helps Jahez, while higher standards for delivery riders could raise costs.**

### Subjective Competitive Strength Analysis Map

- **Moat has to be built, not assumed.** The market has multiple credible rivals (regional incumbents plus well-capitalized entrants), so “peaceful oligopoly” conditions are hard to sustain. The structure is competitive and promo-prone, meaning long-run returns are won by execution (unit economics discipline, retention, logistics efficiency, merchant monetization/ads) rather than by a naturally attractive market structure.
- The market is effectively a duopoly between HungerStation and Jahez, heavily concentrated in major urban centers (Riyadh, Jeddah). While HungerStation leads in raw order volume, Jahez often commands a higher AOV, driven by its focus on premium restaurant partnerships and the “Prime” subscription base.

### Jahez Is Modestly Competitive (2.2/5 Overall Strength)



**Source:** QNBFS Research; Note: Ranked from most favorable for sustainable profitability/strongest industry structure for the incumbent (5) to least favorable (1)

- **Arguably, the most important dynamic is that Meituan’s overseas engine (Keeta) is scaling across the region**—yet Meituan also reported its first quarterly loss since 2022, blamed on an overheating delivery/instant retail battle. That matters for Jahez because it reinforces: **(i)** on the negative side, entrants may be willing to spend heavily to gain density, but **(ii)** on the positive side, there is also a natural constraint if parent-level profitability deteriorates.
- Based on our own proprietary subjective qualitative scoring of Porter’s five competitive forces, **Jahez has no distinct moat though somewhat strong on “threat of substitutes” but weakest on “Intensity of industry rivalry”**. the main implication is that Jahez could struggle to maintain its market share and protect margins.

### Major Risks and Challenges

While we are constructive on Jahez’s outlook, we note that it faces a number of risks, especially near-term, but the company’s strengths and prudent management mitigate many of them. **Jahez’s history of profitable growth demonstrate it can endure competitive shocks better than loss-making rivals – with 3Q2025 results, despite some compression, still show strong unit economics – which provides some margin of safety.** We have factored in reasonable cushions in our forecasts (for instance, a slower 2025/6 to account for competition), but investors should be aware that deviations can occur. We consider the risk/reward balanced in favor of reward at current valuations, but these risks, if materialized in a severe way, could challenge our positive stance. Therefore, an investment in Jahez should be paired with active monitoring of the following factors:

- **Intensifying competition & price wars:** Competition is the most immediate risk. A re-acceleration of aggressive tactics – if a deep-pocketed rival (Keeta/Meituan or potentially a new entrant) decides to sustain heavy discounting or driver overpayment – could force Jahez to respond with margin-eroding measures to defend its user base. Specifically, higher-than-expected impact from new entrants or existing competitors

cutting commissions or flooding the market with promo codes could compress Jahez's order volumes or revenue per order, as was the case during 3Q2025. If, for example, HungerStation or Talabat drastically lower their commissions to poach merchants, Jahez might have to match to avoid restaurant churn, impacting its revenue. Similarly, a scenario where competitors subsidize delivery fees to zero for a prolonged period would pressure Jahez to increase its own subsidies, hurting short-term earnings. We assign this risk a high probability – current signs suggest competitors are pulling back on the most unsustainable practices, but it cannot be ruled out, especially if fresh funding flows into a rival. Mitigants for Jahez include its loyal customer segment (less price-sensitive) and the possible regulatory intervention that would prohibit selling below cost. Nonetheless, this risk could lead to earnings misses/further valuation de-rating versus our forecast if competitive pressure is more severe or prolonged than expected as our thesis is premised on "transitory aggressive marketing practices".

- **Slower adoption of new verticals & geographies:** Our growth projections rely on contributions from new verticals (grocery, advertising, etc.) and new markets (Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar). There is a risk that these initiatives underperform – e.g., quick-commerce might not gain as much traction (perhaps customers remain habituated to using separate grocery apps or supermarkets' own delivery, limiting Jahez's PIK growth), or merchants might be slow to embrace in-app advertising, capping that revenue stream. Internationally, Jahez could face hurdles in scaling Kuwait/Bahrain or integrating Snoonu, leading to slower-than-expected ramp-up outside Saudi. This is more so important in the context that Kuwait and Bahrain are still loss-making. Any such shortfall would directly impact top-line growth and delay the margin improvements. We consider this a moderate risk – Jahez has shown adaptability, but venturing beyond its home turf inherently carries execution uncertainty. We will monitor KPIs like non-KSA order growth and proportion of non-food GMV to gauge progress.
- **Operational integration & execution risks:** The Snoonu acquisition presents integration risk. Merging two companies across borders can bring challenges in systems integration, culture, and realizing synergies. If integration is mishandled, Jahez might not fully capture Snoonu's potential or could incur unexpected costs. Moreover, Jahez's management bandwidth will be split – executing in Saudi while simultaneously expanding regionally. Any execution missteps (such as IT system outages during a major app revamp, or inability to maintain service quality during a growth spurt) could dent Jahez's brand and send users to competitors. We note that in 2022 some delivery apps in the region faced driver strikes or service interruptions; while Jahez has not had major issues, it is always a risk in a logistics-heavy business. Additionally, cybersecurity or data breaches are a risk for any tech platform – a breach could hurt user trust and attract regulatory fines. These operational risks are hard to quantify but bear mentioning.
- **Regulatory and legal risks:** Regulation can cut both ways. While proposed competition law changes are positive, other regulations could increase compliance costs. For example, any move to formally increase wages or benefits for delivery riders (to improve gig worker conditions) would raise Jahez's cost base. Already, countries like UAE have mandated better insurance for drivers; Saudi could follow. Labor nationalization policies (Saudization) might also require hiring more Saudi citizens in certain roles at higher wages. On the restaurant side, if authorities cap the commissions that delivery apps can charge (to protect small restaurants) – a measure seen in some countries during COVID – that would directly hit revenue. We don't foresee an imminent cap in KSA, but it is a possibility if restaurants lobby. Data protection laws are tightening too; Jahez will need to ensure compliance with personal data regulations or face penalties. Lastly, Jahez operates in multiple jurisdictions; any legal disputes (e.g. with drivers over employment status, or with partners) could have financial or reputational repercussions. We rate regulatory risk as low-to-moderate given current trends, but it's something to watch, especially around labor and competition law.
- **Macroeconomic & other risks:** A downturn in consumer spending or a shift in consumer behavior (e.g. post-pandemic, some consumers may revert to dining out more, reducing delivery frequency) could dampen growth. Saudi Arabia's economy is robust, but any major oil price drop or economic slowdown could trickle to discretionary spending like food delivery. Inflation, particularly fuel prices (though subsidized in KSA) or food price inflation (which could reduce order frequency), is another factor. Additionally, geopolitical risks in the Middle East cannot be ignored – any regional instability or shocks could disrupt operations or consumer demand temporarily. Finally, as with any fast-growing tech company, there is valuation risk – high growth stocks can be volatile, and if Jahez fails to meet lofty expectations, the stock could de-rate.

## Sustainability & ESG

- Holistic Approach:** While the "Environment" dimension often dominates global headlines — particularly in the logistics sector where carbon footprints are scrutinized — Jahez has adopted a three-dimensional approach. The company views ESG not just as a compliance metric but as a strategic pillar embedded in its "Lifestyle Ecosystem" vision.
- ESG Ratings & Alignment:** Unlike mature peers with established histories, Jahez is in the process of formalizing its ESG credentials following its transition to the main market. While we came across only a single ESG rating of Jahez by Sustainalytics (of 24.22), we note the company has diligently moved to align itself with global best practices, which could see more ratings emerge from the likes of MSCI. It explicitly maps its internal policies against **MSCI global standards** to identify gaps. Furthermore, Jahez voluntarily adheres to the **Saudi Exchange (Tadawul) ESG Disclosure Guidelines** and is preparing to adopt **IFRS S1 (General Requirements)** and **IFRS S2 (Climate-related Disclosures)** standards in upcoming periods.

### Condensed ESG Framework

- Adoption of Global Standards:** Jahez is positioning itself for future inclusion in global ESG indices by establishing a robust data foundation. In 2024, the company completed a "double materiality assessment" to understand both the impact of ESG factors on its business and its business's impact on society.
- Strategic Roadmap:** The company has implemented a three-year **ESG Roadmap (2023–2026)**. This roadmap moves beyond "greenwashing" concerns by setting measurable targets, such as specific GHG reduction goals and linking executive management remuneration to climate-related KPIs once fully approved. This mirrors the "responsible investing" criteria used by fund managers to screen for robust governance and sustainability trajectories.

### MSCI ESG Framework



Source of Extract: MSCI

### What is Jahez doing or has done to enhance ESG credentials?

- Governance & Corporate Discipline:** Jahez fully complies with the Corporate Governance Regulations issued by the Capital Market Authority (CMA). It maintains a "zero tolerance" policy for bribery and corruption and has established a diverse Board structure with **17% female representation**—a notable metric in the region—and **100% Saudi national** membership.
- Environmental Management & EV Fleet:** Recognizing the environmental impact of last-mile delivery, Jahez launched **"Ebayya,"** a fleet of solar-powered electric vehicles (EVs), and is testing autonomous delivery robots to reduce urban congestion and emissions. In 2024, the company achieved an **11% reduction in GHG emissions intensity** per kilometer driven.
- Waste Management & Circular Economy:** The company launched a "Reverse Vending Machine" (RVM) initiative at its headquarters, collecting over **4,000 plastic bottles** in 2024 to promote recycling. It is also prioritizing a Waste Management Policy for implementation in 2025.
- Social Responsibility (Jahez Foundation):** In 2024, the group established the **Jahez Foundation** to consolidate its community, educational, and charitable efforts under a single strategic umbrella. This includes the "Jahez Ilkhair" platform, which facilitated over **SAR80mn** in donations.
- Human Capital & Safety:** Jahez was certified as a **"Best Place to Work"** in KSA, Kuwait, and Bahrain for 2024. The company prioritizes driver welfare (a critical social risk in the gig economy), conducting over **1,600 hours of safety training** in 2024 which contributed to a reduction in traffic accidents.
- Data Security:** Given its nature as a tech platform, Jahez adheres to the Personal Data Protection Law (PDPL) and GDPR standards to protect customer trust, ensuring robust cybersecurity defenses are in place.

## Company Overview

**Jahez International Company for Information System Technology (Jahez)** is a leading Saudi Arabian on-demand services platform and a pioneer in the Kingdom's digital economy. Founded in 2016, the company has evolved from a food delivery startup into a comprehensive lifestyle ecosystem, becoming the first Saudi technology startup to list on the Saudi Exchange (Tadawul) and achieving "unicorn" status prior to its IPO. The Company has been listed on the parallel market "Nomu" since 2022, moving to main market in 2024. Operating under the mission of "Empowering Businesses, Enhancing Lifestyle," Jahez connects millions of customers with merchants and delivery partners through a vertically integrated ecosystem that spans food delivery, quick commerce (q-commerce), cloud kitchens, and logistics.

## Associated Brands



Source: Company data

## Origins & Product Offering

Launched in 2016, Jahez capitalized on the rapid digital transformation in Saudi Arabia, leveraging high smartphone penetration and a youthful demographic to capture a leading market share in the food aggregator sector. The Group's core offering has expanded beyond the flagship Jahez App to include a suite of complementary verticals:

- Jahez Platform:** The core food delivery application connecting users with over 45,000 merchant branches.
- Grocery & Quick Commerce:** Previously operating as the standalone "PIK" platform, this segment has been unified under the Jahez app as dedicated "Grocery" and "Shops" tiles to improve user experience and capital efficiency.
- Logi:** Established in 2021 as a fully owned subsidiary, Logi serves as the Group's logistics arm. It supports Jahez's own delivery needs while extending last-mile delivery solutions to external e-commerce and logistics clients.
- CO:** A cloud kitchen subsidiary providing commercial kitchen spaces to help merchants expand their geographic reach with minimal capital expenditure.
- Marn:** A business information technology company offering Point of Sale (POS) solutions and merchant software.
- Sol:** A B2B e-commerce platform optimizing the supply chain for the HORECA (Hotel, Restaurant, and Catering) sector by connecting restaurants with wholesale suppliers.
- Blu:** A platform offering a wide range of sports merchandise, ticketing solutions and exclusive membership options. Through strategic partnerships with global and local sports brands, including Al Hilal Saudi Club, Blu ensures fast worldwide delivery and a seamless shopping experience.

## Major Business Units

Jahez reports its operations through four primary segments:

1. **KSA Delivery Platforms:** The primary revenue driver, comprising food delivery and q-commerce operations within Saudi Arabia. This segment focuses on high-value customers (Prime subscribers) and maintaining healthy margins.
2. **Non-KSA Delivery Platforms:** Represents the Group's regional expansion. Jahez operates in **Bahrain** and **Kuwait**, and in late 2025, entered the **Qatar** market through the acquisition of **Snoonu**, a leading local super-app.
3. **Logistics (Logi):** A critical enabler of the ecosystem, Logi delivered 42% of all Jahez group's orders in 2024 and employs a hybrid model of freelancers and employed drivers.
4. **Others:** Includes the supporting verticals **Co** (Cloud Kitchens), **Marn** (POS), and **Sol** (B2B supply), which collectively drive diversification and merchant stickiness.

### **Business Strategy**

Jahez's strategy centers on creating an integrated "Lifestyle Ecosystem" rather than functioning solely as a delivery aggregator. Key strategic pillars include:

- **Regional Expansion:** The acquisition of a majority stake in **Snoonu** (Qatar) serves as a beachhead for wider GCC expansion, unlocking synergies in technology and product innovation.
- **Vertical Integration:** By owning the logistics layer (Logi), kitchen infrastructure (Co), and merchant tech (Marn), Jahez captures more value per order and enhances control over the customer experience.
- **Strategic Partnerships in Q-Commerce:** Moving away from a capital-heavy inventory model, Jahez recently partnered with **Noon** to launch "Noon Minutes" on the Jahez app and invested in **Doos** to leverage their dark store network. This "Capital Efficient Multi-Model" allows rapid entry into the grocery sector without heavy capex.
- **Profitability Focus:** The management emphasizes balanced growth, prioritizing unit economics and "Adjusted EBITDA" over pure top-line expansion, evidenced by a focus on high-value merchants and operational efficiency in logistics.

### **Economic Moats**

- **Network Effects:** A self-reinforcing loop where more merchants (17K+) and branches (45K+) attract more active users (4.4M+), which in turn improves driver density and utilization.
- **Logistics Infrastructure:** Logi provides a defensive moat by ensuring delivery reliability and cost control, a critical advantage over competitors reliant solely on third-party logistics.
- **Data & Technology:** Proprietary AI algorithms for demand forecasting, route optimization, and personalized recommendations enhance user retention and operational efficiency.
- **Switching Costs:** The **Jahez Prime** subscription service increases customer stickiness and share of wallet by incentivizing frequent ordering.

### **ESG Strategy**

Jahez has formalized its commitment to sustainability through a three-year ESG Roadmap (2023–2026).

- **Environmental:** Launch of "**Ebayya**," a solar-powered electric vehicle fleet, to reduce carbon emissions in last-mile delivery. The company is also implementing climate risk assessments aligned with IFRS S1 and S2.
- **Social:** The **Jahez Foundation** oversees CSR initiatives. The company prioritizes driver welfare, conducting over 1,600 hours of safety training in 2024 and achieving "Best Place to Work" certification.
- **Governance:** Adheres to high transparency standards with a diverse board structure and independent audit functions.

### **Management and Board**

The company is led by a team with deep experience in technology and investment.

- **HRH Prince Mishal Bin Sultan Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Chairman):** brings extensive experience in investment and real estate, guiding the company's strategic vision.
- **Eng. Ghassab Bin Salman Bin Mandeel (CEO & Board Member):** A driving force behind the company's transformation from a startup to a publicly listed entity, focusing on execution and growth.
- **Board Composition:** The Board consists of six members (as of the 2020-2024 term), including independent directors and non-executive members with backgrounds in finance, entrepreneurship, and governance.

## Ownership, Organizational Structure & Management

- As of 18 December 2025, Jahez had 209.8mn shares outstanding that combines effective strategic control (43% locked) with a sufficiently deep free float – 57%, which is healthy by regional standards – to sustain institutional ownership and index relevance.


### Ownership Summary

| Shareholder                     | Shares (mn)   | % Of shares outstanding |
|---------------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Free float                      | 119.9         | 57.1%                   |
| Strategic/insider/locked shares | 89.9          | 42.9%                   |
| ALAMAT International Co         | 56.0          | 26.7%                   |
| AZMA Holding Co                 | 15.0          | 7.2%                    |
| Al Omran Abdulaziz              | 8.0           | 3.8%                    |
| Al Bakr Hamad                   | 5.4           | 2.6%                    |
| Mandeel Ghassab                 | 5.0           | 2.4%                    |
| Al Saud Mishal                  | 0.3           | 0.1%                    |
| Jallouli Heni                   | 0.1           | 0.0%                    |
| <b>Total shares outstanding</b> | <b>209.80</b> | <b>100.0%</b>           |

Source: Bloomberg

- Liquidity is not a binding constraint, but valuation sensitivity is tied to any future sell-downs by the core shareholder base – particularly ALAMAT. Within the 57% free float, **notable institutional positions include:**
  - Vanguard Group – ~2.0%
  - BlackRock – ~0.8%
  - State Street – ~0.06%
  - Additional long-only and multi-portfolio asset managers (Janus Henderson, Dimensional, JPM, etc.), each individually sub-1%

### Organogram



Source: Company data

**Board & The Executive**

**Board Members (6)**

1. HRH Prince Mishal Bin Sultan Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Chair)
2. Abdulaziz Bin Abdulrahman Bin Mohammed Al Omran (VC)
3. Salman Bin Abdulmuhsin Bin Mohammed Al Sudeary
4. Loulwa Bint Mohammed Bin Abdulkarim Bakr
5. Ghassab Bin Salman Bin Ghassab Bin Mandeel
6. Hamad Bin Abdullah Bin Fahad Al Bakr

*Source:* Bloomberg

**Executive Management – 11 Members**

1. Ghassab Bin Salman Bin Ghassab Bin Mandeel – CEO/IR
2. Mishal Bin Ibrahim Bin Salem Al-Mishari – Deputy CEO
3. Heni Bin Abdul Hakeem Bin Mohamed Jallouli – CFO
4. Abdulaziz Bin Mohammad Bin Saleh Al Faris – COO
5. Mohammad Bin Abdulaziz Bin Mohammad Al Barrak – CTO
6. Hamad Bin Abdullah Bin Fahad Al Bakr – CBO
7. Abdulaziz Bin Saud Bin Abdulaziz Al Houti – CIO
8. Hamad Bin Salem Bin Hamad Al Saghir – CCO
9. Saed Bin Bashir Bin Nouh Basseet – Chief digital commerce officer
10. Sofiene Mohammed Lamine Marzouki – Chief growth officer
11. Hebah Bint Mohammad Bin Hassan Al Zeer – Internal audit director

*Source:* Bloomberg

## Financial Statements &amp; Projections

## Income Statement

| INCOME STATEMENT                          | 2024                 | 2025E                | 2026E                | 2027E                | 2028E                | 2029E                |
|---|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <b>NET REVENUE</b>                        | <b>2,218,662,735</b> | <b>2,295,250,532</b> | <b>3,204,251,436</b> | <b>3,439,819,657</b> | <b>3,695,133,609</b> | <b>3,960,590,047</b> |
| Revenue from delivery fees                | 1,133,473,721        | 1,025,144,276        | 1,396,497,887        | 1,491,581,179        | 1,592,268,504        | 1,695,712,737        |
| Revenue from commissions                  | 957,669,002          | 1,143,887,671        | 1,649,701,045        | 1,746,087,101        | 1,855,702,679        | 1,968,287,940        |
| Revenue from e-payment fees               | 118,395,652          | 131,267,421          | 181,923,740          | 193,366,828          | 206,367,896          | 219,724,816          |
| Advertising and marketing revenue         | 89,969,813           | 96,772,560           | 143,901,102          | 173,855,757          | 207,948,709          | 245,248,667          |
| Revenue from goods sold and subscriptions | 76,957,192           | 114,708,413          | 126,350,935          | 141,975,502          | 160,243,665          | 179,879,871          |
| Other                                     | 10,515,334           | 5,512,678            | 6,072,196            | 6,823,085            | 7,701,019            | 8,644,700            |
| Promotional compensations and cash back   | (168,317,979)        | (222,042,487)        | (300,195,469)        | (313,869,795)        | (355,098,863)        | (356,908,685)        |
| <b>GROSS PROFIT</b>                       | <b>541,162,565</b>   | <b>532,799,175</b>   | <b>727,785,355</b>   | <b>815,688,436</b>   | <b>876,231,330</b>   | <b>978,785,224</b>   |
| <b>EBITDA</b>                             | <b>219,832,320</b>   | <b>209,954,239</b>   | <b>251,104,629</b>   | <b>250,127,897</b>   | <b>284,233,173</b>   | <b>321,741,542</b>   |
| <b>OPERATING PROFIT</b>                   | <b>168,863,674</b>   | <b>138,510,399</b>   | <b>176,233,829</b>   | <b>206,389,179</b>   | <b>240,183,685</b>   | <b>277,241,303</b>   |
| <b>NET PROFIT</b>                         | <b>184,218,145</b>   | <b>172,701,037</b>   | <b>183,175,214</b>   | <b>220,542,626</b>   | <b>259,546,073</b>   | <b>301,667,692</b>   |

Source: Company data, QNB FS Research

## Balance Sheet

| BALANCE SHEET  | 2024                 | 2025E                | 2026E                | 2027E                | 2028E                | 2029E                |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <b>Non-current asset</b>   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Property and equipment   | 210,753,570          | 702,874,058          | 709,083,615          | 696,131,573          | 684,691,702          | 674,384,810          |
| Intangible assets and Goodwill                                     | 102,179,787          | 835,848,709          | 845,988,512          | 830,749,339          | 814,990,442          | 798,317,220          |
| Right-of-use assets  | 68,999,362           | 37,773,263           | 6,547,164            | 6,547,164            | 6,547,164            | 6,547,164            |
| Investments at FVTPL   | 68,296,898           | 68,296,898           | 68,296,898           | 68,296,898           | 68,296,898           | 68,296,898           |
| Equity accounted investments                                       | 101,250,771          | 99,556,779           | 99,556,779           | 99,556,779           | 99,556,779           | 99,556,779           |
| <b>Total non-current assets</b>                                    | <b>551,480,388</b>   | <b>1,744,349,708</b> | <b>1,729,472,967</b> | <b>1,701,281,752</b> | <b>1,674,082,985</b> | <b>1,647,102,871</b> |
| <b>Current assets</b>  |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Inventory  | 11,074,662           | 11,432,631           | 14,810,376           | 15,672,277           | 16,801,372           | 17,796,792           |
| Trade receivables  | 75,099,846           | 89,167,577           | 120,016,556          | 128,011,091          | 136,675,741          | 145,684,599          |
| Prepaid expenses and other receivables                             | 78,339,914           | 81,044,192           | 113,140,577          | 121,458,378          | 130,473,390          | 139,846,530          |
| Cash and cash equivalents  | 1,054,080,836        | 409,257,525          | 634,597,697          | 899,259,140          | 1,210,097,159        | 1,557,527,950        |
| Deposits with financial institutions                               | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| <b>Total current assets</b>  | <b>1,218,595,258</b> | <b>590,901,925</b>   | <b>882,565,206</b>   | <b>1,164,400,886</b> | <b>1,494,047,662</b> | <b>1,860,855,871</b> |
| <b>Total assets</b>  | <b>1,770,075,646</b> | <b>2,335,251,632</b> | <b>2,612,038,173</b> | <b>2,865,682,638</b> | <b>3,168,130,647</b> | <b>3,507,958,742</b> |
| <b>EQUITY AND LIABILITIES</b>                                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Share capital  | 104,918,030          | 249,148,655          | 249,148,655          | 249,148,655          | 249,148,655          | 249,148,655          |
| Statutory reserve  | 18,420,724           | 18,420,724           | 18,420,724           | 18,420,724           | 18,420,724           | 18,420,724           |
| Share premium  | 740,175,504          | 740,175,504          | 740,175,504          | 740,175,504          | 740,175,504          | 740,175,504          |
| Treasury shares  | (93,072,345)         | (93,072,345)         | (93,072,345)         | (93,072,345)         | (93,072,345)         | (93,072,345)         |
| Employees' shares reserve  | 28,603,985           | 28,603,985           | 28,603,985           | 28,603,985           | 28,603,985           | 28,603,985           |
| Retained earnings  | 441,385,831          | 627,745,565          | 836,366,318          | 1,094,853,467        | 1,403,030,677        | 1,764,815,942        |
| <b>Equity attributable to equity holders of the Parent Company</b> | <b>1,240,431,729</b> | <b>1,571,022,088</b> | <b>1,779,642,841</b> | <b>2,038,129,990</b> | <b>2,346,307,200</b> | <b>2,708,092,465</b> |
| Non-controlling interests  | 9,008,699            | 276,600,001          | 251,154,462          | 213,209,940          | 164,578,803          | 104,461,231          |
| <b>Total shareholders' equity</b>                                  | <b>1,249,440,428</b> | <b>1,847,622,090</b> | <b>2,030,797,304</b> | <b>2,251,339,930</b> | <b>2,510,886,003</b> | <b>2,812,553,695</b> |
| <b>Non-current liability</b>                                       |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Non-current portion of lease liabilities                           | 39,577,915           | 11,279,426           | (18,323,857)         | (17,680,760)         | (17,008,011)         | (16,304,242)         |
| Employees' benefits obligations                                    | 23,007,954           | 23,007,954           | 23,007,954           | 23,007,954           | 23,007,954           | 23,007,954           |
| <b>Total non-current liability</b>                                 | <b>62,585,869</b>    | <b>34,287,380</b>    | <b>4,684,097</b>     | <b>5,327,194</b>     | <b>5,999,943</b>     | <b>6,703,712</b>     |
| <b>Current liability</b>   |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |                      |
| Proceeds due to customers  | 197,397,900          | 203,778,444          | 263,984,319          | 279,347,094          | 299,472,387          | 317,215,038          |
| Current portion of lease liabilities                               | 32,271,396           | 32,271,396           | 32,271,396           | 32,271,396           | 32,271,396           | 32,271,396           |
| Trade payables   | 54,295,193           | 56,050,191           | 72,610,091           | 76,835,693           | 82,371,246           | 87,251,443           |
| Accrued expenses and other current liabilities                     | 151,284,860          | 156,174,880          | 202,316,391          | 214,090,353          | 229,514,286          | 243,112,174          |
| Short term loan  | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    | -                    |
| Zakat provision  | 22,800,000           | 5,067,250            | 5,374,575            | 6,470,979            | 7,615,385            | 8,851,283            |
| <b>Total current liability</b>                                     | <b>458,049,349</b>   | <b>453,342,162</b>   | <b>576,556,772</b>   | <b>609,015,514</b>   | <b>651,244,700</b>   | <b>688,701,334</b>   |
| <b>Total liabilities</b>   | <b>520,635,218</b>   | <b>487,629,542</b>   | <b>581,240,869</b>   | <b>614,342,708</b>   | <b>657,244,644</b>   | <b>695,405,046</b>   |
| <b>Total equity and liabilities</b>                                | <b>1,770,075,646</b> | <b>2,335,251,632</b> | <b>2,612,038,173</b> | <b>2,865,682,638</b> | <b>3,168,130,647</b> | <b>3,507,958,742</b> |

Source: Company data, QNBFS Research

## Cash flow Statement

|  | 2024                 | 2025E                | 2026E               | 2027E              | 2028E                | 2029E                |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| <b>Cash Flow from Operating Activities</b> | <b>202,791,777</b>   | <b>166,708,390</b>   | <b>300,613,502</b>  | <b>258,941,424</b> | <b>300,038,217</b>   | <b>330,969,476</b>   |
| <b>Cash Flow from Investing Activities</b> | <b>(137,582,020)</b> | <b>(783,233,213)</b> | <b>(45,670,046)</b> | <b>5,076,923</b>   | <b>10,127,053</b>    | <b>15,757,547</b>    |
| <b>Cash Flow from Financing Activities</b> | <b>(120,188,442)</b> | <b>(28,298,489)</b>  | <b>(29,603,283)</b> | <b>643,097</b>     | <b>672,749</b>       | <b>703,768</b>       |
| Change in Cash                             | (54,978,685)         | (644,823,311)        | 225,340,172         | 264,661,443        | 310,838,019          | 347,430,791          |
| Opening Cash                               | 1,109,059,521        | 1,054,080,836        | 409,257,525         | 634,597,697        | 899,259,140          | 1,210,097,159        |
| <b>Cash End of Period</b>                  | <b>1,054,080,836</b> | <b>409,257,525</b>   | <b>634,597,697</b>  | <b>899,259,140</b> | <b>1,210,097,159</b> | <b>1,557,527,950</b> |

Source: Company data, QNBFS Research

**Ratios**

|                                  | 2024    | 2025E   | 2026E   | 2027E   | 2028E   | 2029E   |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| <b>Growth Rates</b>              |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| Revenue                          | 24.3%   | 3.5%    | 39.6%   | 7.4%    | 7.4%    | 7.2%    |
| Gross Profit                     | 33.3%   | -1.5%   | 36.6%   | 12.1%   | 7.4%    | 11.7%   |
| EBITDA                           | 45.2%   | -4.5%   | 19.6%   | -0.4%   | 13.6%   | 13.2%   |
| EBIT                             | 65.7%   | -18.0%  | 27.2%   | 17.1%   | 16.4%   | 15.4%   |
| NP                               | 50.0%   | -0.9%   | 11.9%   | 23.9%   | 19.2%   | 17.4%   |
| FCFF                             | -96.5%  | 1393.1% | 109.9%  | 1.2%    | 16.3%   | 10.7%   |
| EPS                              | 51.1%   | -3.4%   | 11.9%   | 23.9%   | 19.2%   | 17.4%   |
| DPS                              | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    |
| CFPS                             | N.M.    | 1042.6% | N.M.    | 17.4%   | 17.4%   | 11.8%   |
| <b>Operating Ratios</b>          |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| Blended take rate (net rev./GMV) | 33.9%   | 31.8%   | 32.9%   | 33.2%   | 33.4%   | 33.6%   |
| Take rate (Commission rate)      | 13.5%   | 14.6%   | 15.9%   | 16.9%   | 16.8%   | 16.8%   |
| Gross Margin                     | 24.4%   | 23.2%   | 22.7%   | 23.7%   | 23.7%   | 24.7%   |
| EBITDA Margin                    | 9.9%    | 9.1%    | 7.8%    | 7.3%    | 7.7%    | 8.1%    |
| EBITDA-to-GMV Margin             | 3.4%    | 2.9%    | 2.6%    | 2.4%    | 2.6%    | 2.7%    |
| EBIT Margin                      | 7.6%    | 6.0%    | 5.5%    | 6.0%    | 6.5%    | 7.0%    |
| Net Margin                       | 8.5%    | 8.1%    | 6.5%    | 7.5%    | 8.3%    | 9.1%    |
| <b>Working Capital Ratios</b>    |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| Inventory Days                   | (2.41)  | (2.41)  | (2.41)  | (2.41)  | (2.41)  | (2.41)  |
| Average Collection Period        | 13.77   | 13.77   | 13.77   | 13.77   | 13.77   | 13.77   |
| Prepayments Days                 | 12.89   | 12.89   | 12.89   | 12.89   | 12.89   | 12.89   |
| Payable Days                     | (11.81) | (11.81) | (11.81) | (11.81) | (11.81) | (11.81) |
| Proceeds due to customers days   | (42.95) | (42.95) | (42.95) | (42.95) | (42.95) | (42.95) |
| Accrued expenses days            | (32.92) | (32.92) | (32.92) | (32.92) | (32.92) | (32.92) |
| <b>Finance Ratios</b>            |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| Debt-Equity Ratio                | 0.06    | 0.03    | 0.01    | 0.01    | 0.01    | 0.01    |
| Net Debt -Equity Ratio           | (0.85)  | (0.28)  | (0.39)  | (0.47)  | (0.54)  | (0.59)  |
| Net Debt -to-Capital             | (5.53)  | (0.38)  | (0.63)  | (0.88)  | (1.17)  | (1.47)  |
| Net Debt -to-EBITDA              | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    |
| Interest Coverage                | 37.34   | 41.81   | 87.76   | N.A.    | N.A.    | N.A.    |
| <b>Return Ratios</b>             |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| ROIC                             | 74.6%   | 9.4%    | 12.7%   | 15.4%   | 18.6%   | 22.3%   |
| ROE                              | 15.2%   | 11.9%   | 11.7%   | 12.7%   | 13.1%   | 13.4%   |
| ROA                              | 10.4%   | 7.4%    | 7.0%    | 7.7%    | 8.2%    | 8.6%    |
| FCF Yield                        | 0.3%    | 3.8%    | 8.0%    | 8.1%    | 9.4%    | 10.4%   |
| <b>Liquidity Ratios</b>          |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| Current Ratio                    | 2.66    | 1.30    | 1.53    | 1.91    | 2.29    | 2.70    |
| Quick Ratio                      | 2.64    | 1.28    | 1.51    | 1.89    | 2.27    | 2.68    |
| <b>Valuation</b>                 |         |         |         |         |         |         |
| EV/Sales                         | 0.89    | 1.16    | 0.75    | 0.63    | 0.50    | 0.38    |
| EV/GMV                           | 0.30    | 0.37    | 0.25    | 0.21    | 0.17    | 0.13    |
| EV/EBITDA                        | 8.97    | 12.71   | 9.62    | 8.60    | 6.47    | 4.64    |
| EV/EBIT                          | 11.68   | 19.27   | 13.70   | 10.42   | 7.66    | 5.39    |
| P/E                              | 16.08   | 16.65   | 14.88   | 12.01   | 10.07   | 8.58    |
| PEG ratio (3YR CAGR)             | 1.57    | 0.91    | 0.74    | 0.68    |         |         |
| P/CF                             | -54.99  | -4.81   | 13.77   | 11.73   | 9.98    | 8.93    |
| P/BV                             | 2.44    | 1.98    | 1.74    | 1.52    | 1.32    | 1.15    |
| Dividend Yield                   | 0.0%    | 0.0%    | 0.0%    | 0.0%    | 0.0%    | 0.0%    |

Source: Company data, QNBFS Research

| Recommendations   |                      | Risk Ratings   |                                   |
|---|----------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| <i>Based on the range for the upside / downside offered by the 12-month target price of a stock versus the current market price</i> |                      | <i>Reflecting historic and expected price volatility versus the local market average and qualitative risk analysis of fundamentals</i> |                                   |
| <b>OUTPERFORM</b>   | Greater than +20%    | <b>R-1</b>   | Significantly lower than average  |
| <b>ACCUMULATE</b>   | Between +10% to +20% | <b>R-2</b>   | Lower than average                |
| <b>MARKET PERFORM</b>   | Between -10% to +10% | <b>R-3</b>   | Medium / In-line with the average |
| <b>REDUCE</b>   | Between -10% to -20% | <b>R-4</b>   | Above average                     |
| <b>UNDERPERFORM</b>   | Lower than -20%      | <b>R-5</b>   | Significantly above average       |

### Contacts

QNB Financial Services Co. W.L.L.  
 Contact Center: (+974) 4476 6666  
[info@qnbfs.com.qa](mailto:info@qnbfs.com.qa)  
 Doha, Qatar

Saugata Sarkar, CFA, CAIA  
 Head of Research  
[saugata.sarkar@qnbfs.com.qa](mailto:saugata.sarkar@qnbfs.com.qa)

Shahan Keushgerian  
 Senior Research Analyst  
[shahan.keushgerian@qnbfs.com.qa](mailto:shahan.keushgerian@qnbfs.com.qa)

Phibion Makuwerere, CFA  
 Senior Research Analyst  
[phibion.makuwerere@qnbfs.com.qa](mailto:phibion.makuwerere@qnbfs.com.qa)

Dana Saif Al Sowaidi  
 Research Analyst  
[dana.al sowaidi@qnbfs.com.qa](mailto:dana.al sowaidi@qnbfs.com.qa)

**Disclaimer and Copyright Notice:** This publication has been prepared by QNB Financial Services Co. W.L.L. ("QNB FS") a wholly-owned subsidiary of Qatar National Bank Q.P.S.C. ("QNB"). QNB FS is regulated by the Qatar Financial Markets Authority and the Qatar Exchange QNB is regulated by the Qatar Central Bank. This publication expresses the views and opinions of QNB FS at a given time only. It is not an offer, promotion or recommendation to Outperform or sell securities or other investments, nor is it intended to constitute legal, tax, accounting, or financial advice. QNB FS accepts no liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect losses arising from use of this report. Any investment decision should depend on the individual circumstances of the investor and be based on specifically engaged investment advice. We therefore strongly advise potential investors to seek independent professional advice before making any investment decision. Although the information in this report has been obtained from sources that QNB FS believes to be reliable, we have not independently verified such information and it may not be accurate or complete. QNB FS does not make any representations or warranties as to the accuracy and completeness of the information it may contain and declines any liability in that respect. For reports dealing with Technical Analysis, expressed opinions and/or recommendations may be different or contrary to the opinions/recommendations of QNB FS Fundamental Research as a result of depending solely on the historical technical data (price and volume). QNB FS reserves the right to amend the views and opinions expressed in this publication at any time. It may also express viewpoints or make investment decisions that differ significantly from, or even contradict, the views and opinions included in this report. This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part without permission from QNB FS.

**COPYRIGHT:** No part of this document may be reproduced without the explicit written permission of QNB FS.